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Many interpret estimated monetary policy rules as suggest-
ing that central banks conduct very sluggish partial adjust-
ment of short-term policy interest rates. In contrast, others
argue that this appearance of policy inertia is an illusion
and simply reﬂects the spurious omission of important per-
sistent inﬂuences on the actual setting of policy. Similarly, the
real-world implications of the theoretical arguments for pol-
icy inertia are open to debate. However, empirical evidence
on policy gradualism obtained by examining expectations of
future monetary policy embedded in the term structure of
interest rates is deﬁnitive and indicates that the actual amount
of policy inertia is quite low.
JEL Codes: E44, E52.
1. Introduction
In recent years, there has been a clear shift in the focus of monetary
policy research. While a decade or so ago, monetary aggregates were
often used to model monetary policy, now the most common rep-
resentation uses a short-term interest rate as the monetary policy
instrument. Indeed, the literature on how central banks manipu-
late policy interest rates has grown very rapidly.1 Especially since
the introduction of the now-ubiquitous Taylor (1993) rule, many
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tor Michael Woodford. Golnaz Motiey and Vuong Nguyen provided excellent
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1For some of the arguments underlying the shift away from monetary aggre-
gates, see Rudebusch and Svensson (2002).
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researchers have examined monetary policy rules or reaction func-
tions that relate the policy interest rate to a small set of observ-
ables.2 There has been voluminous research on the optimal design
of such policy rules and on the empirical estimation of these rules
using historical data. Many important normative and positive issues
regarding the form of these rules have been considered—notably,
the choice of the relevant argument variables in the rules and the
nature of the dynamic adjustment embodied in the rules. This paper
will examine the latter issue and broadly characterize the amount of
monetary policy inertia or partial adjustment contained in optimal
and empirical interest rate rules.
The dynamic adjustment process of monetary policy is a partic-
ularly interesting topic because of the lively debate about its nature.
However, at the outset, it should be noted that this debate is largely
limited to interest rate movements at a quarterly frequency, which
is the relevant frequency for the empirical macroeconomic policy
rules literature. In contrast, at a higher frequency—daily, weekly,
or even monthly—the existence of a short-run smoothing of policy
rates by central banks is widely acknowledged. Such short-term par-
tial adjustment involves, for example, cutting the policy rate by two
25-basis-point moves in fairly quick succession, rather than reducing
the rate just once by 50 basis points.3 However, short-term partial
adjustment within a quarter is essentially independent of whether
there is monetary policy inertia over the course of several quarters,
and this latter issue is the one that is relevant for estimated monetary
policy rules and is discussed below.4
The debate about the dynamic adjustment of central bank pol-
icy rates focuses on the persistent quarterly cyclical ﬂuctuations in
2See Svensson (2003) for a discussion of targeting rules as an alternative
representation.
3For example, as described in Rudebusch (1995), central banks tend to adjust
their policy interest rates in sequences of relatively small steps with only rare
reversals of direction.
4Indeed, as described in Rudebusch (2002b), given their disparate time frames,
a central bank could conduct short-run partial adjustment without quarterly iner-
tia or vice versa. For example, a central bank could spread a desired change over
several quarters but make only one rate adjustment per quarter. Alternatively, it
could spread a desired change over a month or two but essentially hit its desired
rate on a quarterly average basis. It is this latter scenario that is consistent with
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Figure 1. U.S. Economic Data
central bank policy rates—as illustrated in ﬁgure 1 for the United
States.5 The dispute is not about whether such slow adjustment
exists but about its source. One school of thought, the partial-
adjustment view, asserts that the persistence of policy rates reﬂects
an inertia that is intrinsic or endogenous to the central bank. Under
this view, there is a long, intentionally drawn-out adjustment of the
policy rate in response to economic news. Such partial adjustment
implies that the central bank knowingly distributes desired changes
in the policy interest rate over an extended period of time; therefore,
the smooth persistent policy rates reﬂect deliberate “interest rate
smoothing” or “partial adjustment” or “gradualism” or “inertia” on
the part of the central bank. For example, given typical empirical
estimates, if a central bank knew it wanted to increase the policy
rate by a percentage point, it would only raise it by about 20 basis
5Figure 1 shows the quarterly average federal funds rate as the U.S. monetary
policy instrument. Figure 1 also displays two important indicators for policy: the
four-quarter percent change in the price index for personal consumption expen-
ditures excluding food and energy, labeled “inﬂation,” and the output gap as
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points in the ﬁrst three months and by about 60 basis points after
one year. That is, there is a very slow convergence of the policy rate
to its desired level.
The opposing view to partial adjustment is that the persistence
of the policy rate simply reﬂects the response of the central bank
to the slow cyclical ﬂuctuations in the key macroeconomic driving
variables of monetary policy, such as inﬂation and output, which
are also illustrated in ﬁgure 1 for the United States. In this case, the
persistence of the policy rate reﬂects an inertia that is extrinsic or
exogenous to the central bank. Therefore, from this second perspec-
tive, the slow adjustment of the policy rate simply reﬂects the slow
accretion of information relevant to the setting of the policy interest
rate by policymakers, who then completely adjust the policy rate
fairly promptly—typically within a few months—when confronted
with new information.6
This disagreement is not just an academic debate about macro-
economic behavior but is highly relevant to the practical conduct
of monetary policy. For example, as then–Federal Reserve Gover-
nor Larry Meyer noted at the February 1999 Federal Open Mar-
ket Committee meeting (according to the now-public transcript):
“I pay a lot of attention to the policy prescriptions from the Taylor
rule. Sometimes the diﬀerent rules that are in the standard packet
yield quite diﬀerent implications for policy.” Dynamic adjustment
was a key feature that diﬀerentiated the various rules supplied to
Larry Meyer and other Federal Reserve governors.7 Some of the
rules assumed signiﬁcant policy partial adjustment while others did
not, and this diﬀerence led to alternative policy prescriptions. In
particular, the crucial diﬀerence between, say, Taylor rules with and
without endogenous inertia is evident in the policymaker’s reaction
to news about inﬂation and output. For example, when faced with
a surprising economic recession or a jump in inﬂation, the inertial
policymaker slowly changes the policy rate, while the non-inertial
6This same debate also occurs for other macroeconomic time series. For exam-
ple, as many have noted, the infrequent adjustment of prices could reﬂect the
inertial nature of price determination—menu costs, etc.—or it could indicate the
sluggish economic determinants of completely ﬂexible prices.
7This is evident in the now-public “standard packet,” namely, the “Financial
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policymaker responds to the news with immediate and sizable inter-
est rate adjustments. (See the discussion in section 4 below.)
Policymakers themselves appear unclear about the source of the
slow adjustment of policy interest rates. For example, Ben Bernanke
(2004) was a proponent of the intrinsic view in which the slow adjust-
ment of the policy rate reﬂects “partial adjustment and monetary
policy inertia.” In contrast, William Poole (2003) argued that there
was no partial adjustment: “In my view of the world, future policy
actions are almost entirely contingent on the arrival of new infor-
mation.... Given information at the time of a meeting, I believe
that the standing assumption should be that the policy action at
the meeting is expected to position the stance of policy appropri-
ately.” A closely related policy debate, described in Rudebusch and
Williams (2006), centers on how much information central banks
can and should reveal about their future intentions for policy rate
changes. Of course, a central bank that follows a partial-adjustment
procedure typically will be able to communicate insights about
likely future changes in the policy rate—namely, insights about the
remaining policy partial adjustment. However, many policymakers
vehemently deny that they are in a position to provide guidance
about the future path of policy interest rates. As the Governor of
the Bank of England (King 2006) recently noted: “The [Bank of
England’s monetary policy committee] reaches a new judgment each
month, made afresh in the light of all the new information about the
prospects for inﬂation. We don’t decide in advance. So trying to give
direct hints on the path of interest rates over the next few months
risks deceiving ﬁnancial markets into believing there are deﬁnite
plans for the next few months when no such plans exist.”8
Still, to be clear, the absence of central bank partial adjustment
does not mean that central banks are not trying to inﬂuence long-
term interest rates. Again, both sides of this debate agree that a
change in the central bank policy rate is likely to persist, and both
sides agree that such a change in the policy rate is likely to aﬀect
expectations of future short-term rates and hence long-term rates
8Goodhart (2005), a former member of the Bank of England’s monetary policy
committee, also relates how a central bank with no intrinsic inertia can still dis-
play an ex post track record with long sequences of small interest rate adjustments
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as well. In order to inﬂuence the long rate, a central bank only must
present a path for the policy rate that can shape expected future
short rates. The partial-adjustment rule provides one such path, but
it is not the only one. As noted by Goodfriend (1991) and Rudebusch
(1995), an ex ante constant path, which is what some non-inertial
rules approximate, is another obvious choice.
In the next section, in light of the clear theoretical and prac-
tical importance of the topic, I review the basic evidence for and
against monetary policy inertia. The inertial view appears widely
supported by estimated monetary policy rules. When such rules are
estimated without policy inertia, the residuals indicate signiﬁcant,
persistent deviations of the rule recommendation from the historical
policy rate. With the addition of partial adjustment (in the form of
a lagged dependent variable), these deviations are greatly reduced.
The alternative view, as noted above, is that the deviations rep-
resent persistent inﬂuences on central bank behavior that are not
captured in a simple Taylor-type rule. These persistent inﬂuences
may include, for example, responses to ﬁnancial crises, judgmen-
tal adjustments, or diﬀerences between real-time and ﬁnal revised
data. Unfortunately, as is well known in econometrics, at least since
Griliches (1967), the two dynamic representations of partial adjust-
ment and persistent omitted variables can be very hard to distin-
guish in simple single-equation regressions. Indeed, this appears to
be the case for the monetary policy rule regressions, especially since
there is so much uncertainty about the exact arguments of the policy
rules.
Therefore, section 3 turns to theory and examines whether a cen-
tral bank would want to engage in sluggish partial adjustment from
the perspective of optimal monetary policy prescriptions. There are
three key rationales for inertial behavior, namely, to reduce interest
rate volatility, to exploit the expectational channel for monetary pol-
icy, and to respond optimally to data and model uncertainty. While
there appears to be some validity to each of these rationales, they do
not appear to be able to justify the extremely slow monetary policy
inertia suggested by the estimated monetary policy rules.
In contrast to the weak and inconclusive single-equation evidence
and theoretical rationales in sections 2 and 3, a very powerful set
of evidence on monetary policy inertia is introduced in section 4.
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which can bring a vast amount of information to bear on the appro-
priate monetary policy rule. Assuming ﬁnancial market participants
understand the policy rule that links short-term interest rates to the
realizations of macroeconomic variables, they then will also use that
rule in pricing forward interest rates. Accordingly, any deviations
between expected future short-term rates and expected rule rec-
ommendations based on future macroeconomic conditions will be
arbitraged away. Therefore, at any point in time, multiperiod inter-
est rates, which embody expectations of future short rates, will
contain much information about the properties of the monetary
policy reaction function. Section 4 presents three diﬀerent ways to
use such yield-curve information—predictability regressions, macro-
ﬁnance system estimates, and event studies based on macroeconomic
data surprises. These procedures diﬀer in the amount of economic
structure imposed and also operate at three diﬀerent frequencies—
quarterly, monthly, and intraday. The resulting consistent set of
results from these diverse methodologies appears to provide decisive
evidence against the presence of signiﬁcant monetary policy inertia.
Finally, section 5 concludes with some suggestions for future
research.
2. Gradualism and Inertia in Policy Rules
An inertial view of monetary policy dynamic adjustment implies that
the short-term policy rate is changed at a very sluggish pace, so a
monetary policy reaction to new economic data is distributed over
many quarters. I ﬁrst clarify policy inertia as a general proposition
(or, depending on your perspective, highlight some of the ambigu-
ity involved with any such deﬁnition) and then survey some of the
relevant empirical work.
2.1 Deﬁning Policy Gradualism and Inertia
It is perhaps useful to discuss in general terms what is meant by the
“inertial” and “non-inertial” hypotheses regarding the conduct of
policy. In the literature, “inertial” rules follow the standard partial-
adjustment form: it =( 1− ρ)ˆ ıt + ρit−1, where it is the level of the
policy interest rate set in quarter t, which is a weighted average of
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Based on historical data, estimates of ρ are often in the range of
0.8, so these empirical rules appear to imply a very slow speed of
adjustment—about 20 percent per quarter—of the policy rate to
its fundamental determinants. The large coeﬃcient on the lagged
dependent variable is widely interpreted as evidence for a “monetary
policy inertia” behavior by central banks.9
In fact, at a general level, it does not seem that any logical dis-
tinction can be drawn between inertial and non-inertial rules as
descriptions of policy. For example, by deﬁning an “underlying”
desired interest rate level as ˜ ıt = ρ˜ ıt−1 +(1−ρ)ˆ ıt, the above inertial
interest rate rule can be rewritten in an ostensibly non-inertial form
as it =˜ ıt.10 That is, an inertial versus non-inertial designation makes
sense only in conjunction with speciﬁc assumptions about the argu-
ments of the rule. Of course, there is a natural set of arguments to
consider, namely, the standard major macroeconomic data series—
especially inﬂation and output, which are the arguments of the pop-
ular Taylor rule. Indeed, the hypothesis examined in this paper is
not partial adjustment in all its generality, but partial adjustment
toward a target that depends in a straightforward way on inﬂation
and output (as exempliﬁed by the Taylor rule). As described below,
this is the case of overwhelming interest in the literature.
Therefore, to make progress, I will limit consideration to rules
in which the desired rate is a simple function of a set of standard
macroeconomic variables, formally, ˆ ıt = β Xt, where Xt is a vec-
tor of the variables inﬂuencing policy. The inertial rule can then be
written as
it =( 1− ρ)β Xt + ρit−1. (1)
The corresponding non-inertial rule is
it = β Xt. (2)
9For example, Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler (2000, 157–58) describe their U.S.
estimates of various partial-adjustment policy rules as follows: “...the estimate
of the smoothing parameter ρ is high in all cases, suggesting considerable interest
rate inertia: only between 10 and 30 percent of a change in the [desired interest
rate] is reﬂected in the Funds rate within the quarter of the change.”
10This is just the observational equivalence of the information-smoothing and
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The common ﬁnding in the empirical literature discussed below is
that the inertial rule ﬁts the data better (say, in an R2 sense) than
the non-inertial rule. An alternative view, however, is that the non-
inertial rule is not misspeciﬁed in terms of dynamics but in terms of
arguments, so there is an alternative non-inertial rule that could be
formalized as
it = β Xt + φ Zt, (3)
where Zt is a vector of persistent omitted factors that also inﬂuence
policy. The rest of this paper discusses the evidence for these varying
speciﬁcations.
2.2 Gradualism and Inertia in Estimated Policy Rules
The belief in sluggish policy adjustment in the real world is based
on estimated policy rules. The most commonly estimated inertial
policy rules have been dynamic forms of the Taylor rule. In such
rules, the actual interest rate partially adjusts to a desired interest
rate that depends on inﬂation and the output gap; speciﬁcally,
it =( 1− ρ)ˆ ıt + ρit−1 + ξt (4)
ˆ ıt = k + gπ¯ πt + gyyt, (5)
where k is a constant incorporating an equilibrium real rate, r∗,
and an inﬂation target, π∗, and gπ and gy are the central bank
response coeﬃcients to (four-quarter) inﬂation (¯ πt) and the output
gap (yt).11
To provide a benchmark for comparison, ﬁrst consider an esti-
mated non-inertial Taylor rule that assumes ρ = 0, as in Taylor
(1999) and Yellen (2004). A least-squares regression on U.S. data
11The federal funds rate is a quarterly average rate. Inﬂation is deﬁned using
the price index for personal consumption expenditures excluding food and energy
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Figure 2. Actual and Fitted Federal Funds Rate
from 1987:Q4 to 2004:Q4 yields






σξ = .97, ¯ R2 = .82,D W = .34.
The monetary policy response coeﬃcients—namely, gπ =1 .39 for
inﬂation response and gy =0 .92 for output response—are not too
far from the 1.5 and 0.5 that Taylor (1993) originally used. The ﬁt-
ted values from this non-inertial Taylor-rule regression, which will
be denoted ˆ ıNI
t , are shown as the dotted line in ﬁgure 2 and show a
fairly good ﬁt to the actual funds rate—the thick solid line. However,
there are some large persistent deviations between the non-inertial
rule and the historical funds rate, especially during 1992, 1993, 1999,
and 2004 (when the actual rate was held below the rule) and during
1991, 1995, and 1996 (when the rate was pushed above the rule).
As discussed below, the source of these deviations will be a critical
element in interpreting the evidence and arguments for and against
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A partial-adjustment mechanism is a standard econometric
response to such persistent deviations, and a least-squares regres-
sion for an inertial policy rule on U.S. data from 1987:Q4 to 2004:Q4
yields
it =.22 ˆ ıI




t =2.13 +1.33 ¯ πt +1 .29 yt
(.18) (.18) (.13) (8)
σξ = .38, ¯ R2 = .97.
In this regression, the estimated values of the response coeﬃcients
are not so diﬀerent from the non-inertial rule; however, the esti-
mate of the partial-adjustment coeﬃcient (ˆ ρ =0 .78) is economically
and statistically signiﬁcant. Such lagged dependence is an extremely
robust empirical result in the literature.12 Indeed, after taking into
account the dynamic adjustment in equation (7), the ﬁtted values in
the inertial rule—which are shown as the thin solid line in ﬁgure 2—
match the historical path of the funds rate much more closely than
the non-inertial rule. This diﬀerence in ﬁt is also apparent in ﬁgure 3,
which charts the residuals (ξI
t and ξNI
t ) from the inertial and non-
inertial rules. The mean absolute residual for the non-inertial rule
is .82 percentage point, which is almost three times larger than the
.29-percentage-point mean absolute residual for the inertial rule.
The signiﬁcance of ρ and the dramatic improvement in R2 have
been widely taken to be convincing evidence of monetary policy
inertia. However, Rudebusch (2002b) argues that the monetary pol-
icy rule estimates are misleading and provide the illusion of mone-
tary policy inertia. In particular, if the desired policy interest rate
depends on persistent factors other than the current output and
inﬂation in the Taylor rule, then such a misspeciﬁcation could result
in a spurious ﬁnding of partial adjustment. Accordingly, based only
on these types of policy rule estimates, it would be very diﬃcult
12Similar estimates are discussed by Kozicki (1999) and Rudebusch (2002b)
for the United States and by Sauer and Sturm (2003), Gerdesmeier and Roﬃa
(2004), and Castelnuovo (2006) for the euro area.96 International Journal of Central Banking December 2006
Figure 3. Residuals from Estimated Inertial and
Non-Inertial Taylor Rules
to distinguish whether the Federal Reserve’s adjustment was slug-
gish or whether the Federal Reserve generally followed the Taylor
rule with no policy inertia but sometimes deviated from the rule for
several quarters at a time in response to other factors.
The intuition for this argument is illustrated in ﬁgures 4 and 5.
Figure 4 displays the actual funds rate (thick solid line) and the
“desired” funds rates from the two rules. The non-inertial rule
desired rates are the ﬁtted values ˆ ıNI
t from equation (6) (shown as
the dotted line), and the inertial rule desired values are the ˆ ıI
t from
equation (8) (shown as the thin solid line). The two desired levels
generally move together, so deviations of these desired rates from
the actual funds rate are similar across the two rules. Understand-
ing the persistent deviations of the historical interest rate from the
two Taylor-rule recommendations is key to interpreting the empiri-
cal evidence. Under the monetary policy inertia interpretation, these
persistent deviations are the result of sluggish central bank responses
to output and inﬂation gaps; that is, the central bank only gradu-
ally adjusts the policy rate to the level it would like to set in theVol. 2 No. 4 Monetary Policy Inertia: Fact or Fiction? 97
Figure 4. Actual and Desired Federal Funds Rate
absence of some partial-adjustment constraint. However, there are
several episodes evident in ﬁgure 4 that appear to contradict such
an interpretation. For example, at the beginning of 1995, the actual
funds rate matched the desired funds rate (as recommended by either
rule), but over the rest of that year, the desired funds rate dropped
almost 200 basis points, while the actual funds rate jumped 100
basis points. Conversely, after the third quarter of 1998, when the
actual rate equaled the desired values, desired rates rose sharply for
the next year, while the actual funds rate dropped. Adding a lagged
funds rate to the equation will certainly improve the regression ﬁt,
but it appears misleading to characterize these episodes as central
bank partial adjustment when the actual and desired funds rates
moved so dramatically in opposite directions.
The deviations of the two desired funds rate series from the actual
funds rate are shown in ﬁgure 5 (namely, it−ˆ ıNI
t as the solid line and
it−ˆ ıI
t as the dotted line). Instead of a partial-adjustment explanation
for these deviations, an alternative explanation is that the devia-
tions in ﬁgure 5 reﬂect the incomplete description of monetary policy98 International Journal of Central Banking December 2006
Figure 5. Deviations of Actual Funds Rate from
Desired Rule Value
provided by the Taylor rule. Indeed, it is fairly straightforward to
provide a basic narrative history of a variety of macroeconomic devel-
opments that the Federal Reserve appeared to respond to in addition
to estimates of the contemporaneous output gap and inﬂation. Some
of these developments are indicated in ﬁgure 5.13 For example, rela-
tive to what the Taylor rule would have recommended, a response to
the stock market crash may have lowered rates in 1988, and inﬂation
worries—at least, as discussed below, when judged using real-time
data—appear to have led to a greater-than-Taylor-rule tightening
during 1989. The deviations toward looser monetary policy in 1992
and 1993 have been interpreted as the Federal Reserve’s response
to disruptions in the ﬂow of credit or severe ﬁnancial headwinds.14
13The original analysis of Taylor (1993) put forward a description of monetary
policy that did not involve interest rate smoothing or partial adjustment. Taylor
argued that deviations from the rule during various episodes were an appropriate
response to special circumstances. Kozicki (1999) also makes this point.
14As then–Chairman of the Board of Governors Alan Greenspan testiﬁed to
Congress on June 22, 1994: “Households and businesses became much more reluc-
tant to borrow and spend and lenders to extend credit—a phenomenon oftenVol. 2 No. 4 Monetary Policy Inertia: Fact or Fiction? 99
An inﬂation scare at the end of 1994—evidenced by a rapid rise in
long-term interest rates—preceded a sustained period of tight policy.
Another factor that emerged during this period was the remarkable
increase in the growth rate of productivity and potential output.
At the time, most economists didn’t recognize these changes and
hence overestimated the degree of utilization in labor and product
markets, which likely was reﬂected in tighter policy. In 1998 and
1999, a worldwide ﬁnancial crisis following the Russian default and
devaluation appears to have played a role in lowering rates.15 Simi-
larly, there was a rapid easing in response to events of September 11,
2001. Finally, 2003 and 2004 were dominated by fears of deﬂation,
which would likely be reﬂected in lower rates than a simple Taylor
rule would recommend, given potential concerns at the zero lower
bound for the policy rate (as discussed in McGough, Rudebusch,
and Williams 2005).
This narrative suggests that some Taylor-rule residuals reﬂect
diﬀerences between policy judgments made with real-time data and
Taylor-rule estimations conducted with ﬁnal revised data—a topic
that deserves special attention (see Rudebusch 1998, 2001, 2002a,
2002b, and Orphanides 2001, 2003). Figure 6 provides some evidence
on the importance of these eﬀects in the United States by showing
the diﬀerence between real-time and current estimates of the output
gap, which is denoted yt|t−yt|T, and the diﬀerence between real-time
and current estimates of inﬂation, which is denoted ¯ πt|t − ¯ πt|T.16
referred to as the ‘credit crunch.’ In an endeavor to defuse these ﬁnancial strains,
we moved short-term rates lower in a long series of steps that ended in the late
summer of 1992, and we held them at unusually low levels through the end of
1993—both absolutely and, importantly, relative to inﬂation.”
15Federal Reserve Governor Larry Meyer (1999, 7) had this explanation for the
easing of policy during late 1998: “There are three developments, each of which,
I believe, contributed to this decline in the funds rate relative to Taylor Rule
prescription. The ﬁrst event was the dramatic ﬁnancial market turbulence, fol-
lowing the Russian default and devaluation. The decline in the federal funds rate
was, in my view, appropriate to oﬀset the sharp deterioration in ﬁnancial market
conditions, including wider private risk spreads, evidence of tighter underwriting
and loan terms at banks, and sharply reduced liquidity in ﬁnancial markets.”
16The output-gap series is Federal Reserve Board staﬀ’s real-time estimate—
kindly supplied by David Small from the FOMC Secretariat—minus the current
(as of 2005) CBO output-gap estimate. The inﬂation series is the real-time four-
quarter GDP deﬂator inﬂation rate—obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia real-time data website—minus the current release.100 International Journal of Central Banking December 2006
Figure 6. Diﬀerences between Real-Time and
2005 Data Vintages
(The output-gap revisions end in 1998 because of data conﬁden-
tiality.) For example, ﬁgure 6 shows that in real time, the out-
put gap from 1996 through 1998 was estimated to be about a
percentage point higher than the current estimate (because the
estimated level of potential output was lower in real time). This
underestimation of the degree of macroeconomic slack would be
reﬂected in higher interest rates in real time than a Taylor rule
estimated with current data would recommend. Similarly, during
1989, inﬂation was thought to be running about half of a percent-
age point faster than current estimates would indicate, so the actual
policy rate would likely be higher than the ﬁnal-data rule would
recommend.
It is possible to provide a rough indication of the importance of
the data revisions in accounting for the Taylor-rule residuals. The
predicted Taylor-rule residuals based on the real-time to ﬁnal-data
revisions can be constructed under the assumption that the Federal
Reserve followed the estimated non-inertial rule (6) in real time.
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Figure 7. Matching Non-Inertial Rule Residuals with
Real-Time Data Revisions
Taylor-rule coeﬃcients to conduct policy, so it =2 .0 4+1 .39¯ πt|t +
.92yt|t, then the predicted residuals in equation (6) would equal
1.39(¯ πt|t − ¯ πt|T)+.92(yt|t − yt|T). These constructed residuals pre-
dicted by the data revisions are shown in ﬁgure 7, along with the
non-inertial rule residuals from equation (6). The fairly close corre-
lation between the predicted residuals from real-time data revisions
and the actual residuals from the estimated non-inertial rule sug-
gests that a substantial amount of the deviations of the actual rate
from the rule estimated with the current vintage of data can be
accounted for by the reactions to real-time data and not to central
bank partial adjustment.17
17Lansing (2002) provides a careful simulation study that demonstrates the
potential eﬀectiveness of such real-time output-gap errors to account for spurious
evidence of policy inertia. Also, see Mehra (2002) and Apel and Jansson (2005)
for the United States and Sauer and Sturm (2003) for the euro area. In addition,
given the large policy rule inﬂation response coeﬃcient, inﬂation data revisions
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However, while real-time data revisions are undoubtedly part of
the story, it is unlikely, as suggested in ﬁgure 5, that the Federal
Reserve follows a Taylor rule in real time. Instead, like other cen-
tral banks, it reacts in a less-simplistic fashion to a wide variety
of macroeconomic developments; that is, the alternative to partial
adjustment is the misspeciﬁcation of the Taylor rule. This omitted-
variables view of the non-inertial Taylor-rule residuals is supported
by much contemporaneous press coverage and the narrative policy
record. Still, it would be more satisfying to be able to provide econo-
metric evidence distinguishing between the partial-adjustment and
omitted-variables interpretations of the policy rule estimates.
Unfortunately, Rudebusch (2002b) argues that conclusive evi-
dence from simple policy rule estimates on the extent of inertia is
inherently diﬃcult to obtain. For example, suppose that the non-
inertial rule deviations, which presumably represent various persis-
tent factors—credit crunches, ﬁnancial crises, etc.—that a central
bank might respond to, could be modeled as a simple ﬁrst-order
autoregressive process. Then, instead of the inertial model of cen-
tral bank behavior in equations (4) and (5), the representation of
policy would be the serially correlated shock model:
it = k + gπ¯ πt + gyyt + ξt (9)
ξt = ρeξt−1 + ωt. (10)
The salient question is whether it is possible to distinguish between
model (4) and (5) and model (9) and (10). Rudebusch (2002b) esti-
mates a single equation that nests the inertial and serially correlated
shocks rules and ﬁnds that the evidence distinguishing these two
rules appears fragile to even modest changes in the sample period.
His argument draws on a large literature in econometrics show-
ing that estimates of partial-adjustment models commonly indicate
an unrealistically slow adjustment—whether applied to inventory
behavior (Blinder 1986) or money demand (Goodfriend 1985).18
In particular, a standard policy rule with slow partial adjustment
18There is a large literature that argues that partial-adjustment models are
diﬃcult to identify and estimate empirically in the presence of serially correlated
shocks (e.g., Griliches 1967; Hall and Rosanna 1991; and McManus, Nankervis,
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and no serial correlation in the errors will be diﬃcult to distinguish
empirically from a policy rule that has immediate policy adjust-
ment but highly serially correlated shocks. The choice between these
two dynamic structures, which depends crucially on separating the
inﬂuences of contemporaneous and lagged regressors, is especially
diﬃcult to untangle for empirical monetary policy rules for several
reasons (also see Carare and Tchaidze 2005). First, the arguments
of the rules—four-quarter inﬂation and the output gap—are highly
serially correlated, so distinguishing the eﬀect of, say, ¯ πt from ¯ πt−1
is not easy. Second, the arguments of the rules are not exogenous.
Third, only short data samples of plausibly consistent rule behav-
ior are available with a limited amount of business-cycle variation
in output and inﬂation. Fourth, there is some uncertainty about the
appropriate arguments of the historical policy rule. Finally, as noted
above, the actual interest rates are set on the basis of real-time data
on output and inﬂation, which can also make it diﬃcult to determine
the correct dynamics.
There have been several interesting extensions of the analysis in
Rudebusch (2002b). English, Nelson, and Sack (2003) and Gerlach-
Kristen (2004b) provide two slightly diﬀerent tests of the inertial and
serially correlated shock interpretations that, unlike in Rudebusch
(2002b), allow for both partial adjustment and serially correlated
shocks to be jointly present. These authors ﬁnd evidence that both
features are signiﬁcant elements in the data; therefore, the stan-
dard policy rule estimates in (7) and (8) are omitting important
persistent factors (similar results for the euro area are provided by
Castelnuovo 2006). However, considerable uncertainty remains, as
illustrated by the insightful small-sample calculations conducted by
English, Nelson, and Sack (2003). They investigate how much of the
deviations of the actual rate from the desired rate (the it − ˆ ıI
t in
ﬁgure 5) can be accounted for by partial adjustment. They ﬁnd that
a 95 percent conﬁdence interval stretches from 8 percent to 88 per-
cent; therefore, in the context of a single-equation regression, it is
diﬃcult to ascertain how economically important partial adjustment
is for the policy rule. In addition, this wide range of uncertainty is
only for a particular rule speciﬁcation and estimation sample, so it
ignores the broader uncertainty noted above.
Furthermore, the assumption that the persistent omitted variable
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results and boost the evidence for partial adjustment. Indeed, the
narrative history summarized in ﬁgure 5 suggests a more-subtle reac-
tion function than can be captured by equations (9) and (10). A few
have tried to augment the estimated Taylor rule with other vari-
ables in order to capture directly the omitted persistent inﬂuences
on policy that spuriously induce the appearance of policy inertia. For
example, Gerlach-Kristen (2004b) and Driﬃll et al. (2006) ﬁnd evi-
dence that proxies for ﬁnancial stability concerns, such as a private-
public credit spread, have explanatory power in the Taylor rule.
Also, expectations appear to play an important role in tempering
the policy response to current readings on output and inﬂation, and
Mehra (2002) suggests that expectations of future inﬂation—and, in
particular, inﬂation scares in the bond market—are an important
consideration for policy, which—when omitted—will appear as pol-
icy inertia. Finally, as shown by Trehan and Wu (2006), ignoring
a true time-varying equilibrium real rate (r∗
t) can lead to ﬁnding
policy inertia when there is really none.19 Overall, however, the lit-
erature on augmenting the Taylor rule with the important determi-
nants of policy other than current output and inﬂation appears to
be incomplete at best.
3. Rationales for Sluggish Adjustment by Central Banks
The discussion above indicates that, given the distinct possibility
of omitted persistent variables from the monetary policy rules, the
usual single-equation evidence from estimated policy reaction func-
tions is inconclusive regarding the empirical importance of policy
inertia. In this section, I take a diﬀerent tack and examine the nor-
mative case for interest rate smoothing. Presumably, if theory can
provide a fairly compelling rationale for the existence of inertia as a
feature of optimal monetary policy, then the case for real-world par-
tial adjustment would be strengthened. Therefore, in this section,
I consider the empirical relevance of the three most important
19In Europe, Gerlach and Schnabel (2000) ﬁnd that a Taylor rule ﬁts well
without partial adjustment but with dummies for the period 1992:Q3–1993:Q3
to control for intra-European exchange market pressures. Gerlach-Kristen (2004a)
ﬁnds that the long rate is signiﬁcant in a euro-area Taylor rule, while Gerdesmeier
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explanations for why central banks might ﬁnd partial adjustment
attractive.
3.1 Gradualism and Volatility Reduction
One consequence of policy inertia is to produce interest rates that
are less volatile than would be suggested by the determinants of pol-
icy. As the speed of adjustment coeﬃcient ρ increases, the variances
of the level and changes in the policy instrument decline. Therefore,
an obvious rationale for policy gradualism would be some desire on
the part of the central bank to reduce the volatility in interest rates
and, more generally, in asset prices. Such a desire can be modeled
directly in the central bank’s loss function, and then, together with
a model of the economy, the optimal ρ coeﬃcient can be calculated
for an optimal simple Taylor rule (as in, for example, Rudebusch and
Svensson 1999). If the optimal monetary policy partial-adjustment
coeﬃcient matched the high empirical estimates of ρ, then those
estimates would have some greater credence.
The most common way to model a desire for smooth interest
rates is to specify a loss function in which the central bank min-
imizes a weighted sum of the squared inﬂation gap, the squared
output gap, and changes in the policy rate (see Clarida, Gal´ ı, and
Gertler 1999 and Rudebusch and Svensson 1999):
Lt =1 /2

(¯ πt − π∗)2 + λy2
t + ν∆i(∆it)2
, (11)
where ∆it = it − it−1. The parameters λ ≥ 0 and ν∆i ≥ 0 are
the relative weights on output and interest rate stabilization with
respect to inﬂation stabilization. The intertemporal loss function in






with a discount factor δ (0 <δ<1). For δ = 1, this loss function can
be represented by the unconditional mean of the period loss function
(Rudebusch and Svensson 1999)
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which equals the weighted sum of the unconditional variances of
the three goal variables and is the standard loss function in the
literature.20
The presence of an interest rate smoothing motive in the loss
function has some superﬁcial plausibility, especially in light of the lit-
erature that analyzes changes in policy interest rates on a day-by-day
basis. In the United States (e.g., Goodfriend 1991 and Rudebusch
1995) and many other countries (e.g., Goodhart 1997 and Lowe
and Ellis 1997), central banks generally make changes in the policy
rate at discrete intervals and in discrete amounts. Rudebusch (1995,
264), for example, describes a short-term interest rate smoothing
in which the Federal Reserve adjusts interest rates “...in limited
amounts ... over the course of several weeks with gradual increases
or decreases (but not both)....”This smoothing likely reﬂects vari-
ous institutional rigidities, such as a ﬁxed monthly meeting schedule
and perhaps certain sociological and political inﬂuences.21 However,
as noted in the introduction, short-term partial adjustment within
a quarter is essentially independent of whether there is monetary
policy inertia over the course of several quarters, and it is this latter
issue that is relevant for empirical monetary policy rules. Indeed,
if the underlying rationale for reducing interest rate volatility is to
reduce instability in ﬁnancial markets (as described by, for exam-
ple, Goodfriend 1991, Rudebusch 1995, Cukierman 1996, and Lowe
and Ellis 1997), then not wanting to move the policy rate by 50 basis
points on a particular day is very diﬀerent from not wanting to move
it by 50 basis points on a quarterly average basis.
This issue is highlighted in trying to specify the weight ν∆i on
quarterly interest rate volatility relative to the variability of the
output and inﬂation gaps. If λ and ν∆i are both set equal to 1,
20However, the choice of δ is not innocuous. As shown in Dennis (2006), greater
discounting may lead to less concern about the future and less interest rate
smoothing.
21At a single meeting, large interest rate changes may be diﬃcult to achieve
politically because of the decision-making process (e.g., Goodhart 1997) or
because such changes may be taken as an adverse signal of inconsistency and
incompetence (e.g., Goodhart 1999). Indeed, many have noted an “aversion to
reversals” in which raising (or lowering) the policy rate at one meeting pre-
cludes a lowering (raising) at the next. Again, it appears unlikely that such a
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then the loss function equally penalizesa1p ercent output gap, a
1-percentage-point inﬂation gap, and a 1-percentage-point quarterly
change in the funds rate. This penalty on interest rate volatility
appears to be implausibly high, given the overwhelming emphasis
among central banks on the ﬁrst two objectives relative to the third
(e.g., the “dual mandate” in the United States). Indeed, in practice,
central banks have at times implemented large changes in policy
rates, which contradicts the notion of a signiﬁcant penalty. Per-
haps the most extreme example occurred in September 1992, when
the Swedish central bank raised its policy rate from 20 percent to
500 percent in one week in an attempt to maintain a ﬁxed exchange
rate. Also, during the 1979–82 monetary experiment, the United
States had much greater interest rate volatility, which did not appear
to impose, on its own, large costs. In the academic literature, ν∆i is
often set equal to 0.5o r0 .1. These loss functions equally penalize
a 1 percent output gap, a 1-percentage-point inﬂation gap, and a
1.41- or 3.16-percentage-point quarterly change in the funds rate.
Such weights still seem at the high end of the plausible range of
penalties to reduce volatility, especially in a world with a wide vari-
ety of ﬁnancial market instruments that allow for hedging against
interest rate volatility.
Finally, I should note that even the speciﬁcation of the interest
rate smoothing objective in the loss function is unclear. Svensson
(2003) notes that if the motive in reducing interest rate volatility
is to avoid ﬁnancial instability, then the loss function should be
speciﬁed to minimize the surprise in the policy rate:
E[Lt] = Var[¯ πt − π∗]+λVar[yt]+νEiVar[Et−1[it] − it], (14)
where νEi ≥ 0 is the relative weight on policy rate surprises. A third
speciﬁcation, advocated by Woodford (1999), penalizes the variabil-
ity in the level of the policy rate:
E[Lt] = Var[¯ πt − π∗]+λVar[yt]+νiVar[it − r∗ − π∗], (15)
where νi ≥ 0 is the weight on deviations of the nominal rate from a
neutral level.22
22Woodford (1999, 2003) argues that smaller interest rate ﬂuctuations reduce
the likelihood of reaching the zero bound on nominal interest rates and the108 International Journal of Central Banking December 2006
On its own, motivating a large partial-adjustment coeﬃcient
through a central bank loss-function desire for interest rate smooth-
ing appears unrealistic (e.g., Svensson 2003). This is particularly true
in a model with no explicit forward-looking expectational terms, as
in Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), where an optimal ρ in a dynamic
Taylor rule of greater than .2 or .3 is diﬃcult to obtain. However,
results can be very diﬀerent in forward-looking models, which are
considered in the next subsection.
3.2 Central Bank Inertia as a Lever on Expectations
The most passionate advocates for optimal monetary policy partial
adjustment base their case on the ability of such inertia to allow
the central bank to inﬂuence the current state of the economy by
promising future actions; that is, sluggish adjustment can be a lever
to help move and manage expectations. In particular, partial adjust-
ment can be optimal if the private sector is forward looking and the
monetary policymaker is credibly committed to a gradual policy rule
(see Levin, Wieland, and Williams 1999; Rotemberg and Woodford
1999; Woodford 1999, 2003; and Sack and Wieland 2000). In such a
situation, the small inertial changes in the policy interest rate that
are expected in the future can have a large eﬀect on current supply
and demand and can help the central bank control macroeconomic
ﬂuctuations.23
This argument can be elucidated and assessed within a sim-
ple expectational model. Rudebusch (2002b, 2005) describes an
associated adverse eﬀects on macroeconomic stability; however, with a properly
speciﬁed model, such concerns should be captured in the output and inﬂation sta-
bilization concerns in the loss function. Woodford (2003) also tries to motivate
this speciﬁcation of the loss function by appealing to the transactions frictions
underlying money demand (so-called shoe-leather costs).
23This argument can be thought of as a special case of the more general ration-
ale that it−1 is likely an important state variable given the dynamic structure
of the economy, so the optimal instrument rule would include a response to it
(e.g., Rudebusch and Svensson 1999). However, it should be noted that Woodford
considers fully optimal policy, not an optimal simple rule of the form (1) and (2).
Persistence of optimal policy under commitment arises because of the response
of policy to previous promises through the lagged Lagrange multipliers (Dennis
2005). Some might interpret these lagged Lagrange multipliers as the unobserved
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empirical version of the New Keynesian model24 suitable for quar-
terly data, where inﬂation and output are determined by future
expectations and lags on the past:
πt = µπEt−1¯ πt+3 +( 1− µπ)Σ4
j=1απjπt−j + αyyt−1 + εt, (16)
yt = µyEt−1yt+1 +( 1− µy)Σ2
j=1βyjyt−j − βr(rt−1 − r∗)+ηt, (17)
where Et−1¯ πt+3 represents the expectation of average inﬂation over
the next year and Et−1yt+1 represents the expectation of period t+1
output conditional on a time t−1 information set. The real rate rel-
evant for output, rt−1, is deﬁned as a weighted combination of an
ex ante one-year rate and an ex post one-year rate:
rt−1 = µr(Et−1¯ ıt+3 − Et−1¯ πt+4)+( 1− µr)(¯ ıt−1 − ¯ πt−1), (18)




This model allows consideration of a wide range of explicit
forward-looking behavior. At one extreme, the model with µπ, µy,
and µr set equal to zero matches the completely adaptive expec-
tations model of Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and Rudebusch
(2001), which has had some success in approximating the time-series
data in the manner of a small estimated vector autoregression (VAR)
(see Estrella and Fuhrer 2002; Fuhrer and Rudebusch 2004). How-
ever, estimated forward-looking models also have had some success
in ﬁtting the data, as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and Fuhrer
(2000). The analysis below takes an eclectic view and conditions on
a wide range of possible values for µπ, µy, and µr.25
Table 1 summarizes the optimal amount of monetary policy iner-
tia for various models and loss functions. The table displays the lag
coeﬃcients ρ from the optimal versions of the inertial Taylor rule
in equations (4) and (5) across models with a range of forward-
looking behavior and using the three diﬀerent loss functions in
24Much of the appeal of the New Keynesian model lies in its foundations in
a dynamic general equilibrium model with nominal price rigidities; see Walsh
(2003) and Woodford (2003).
25In contrast, there is less contention regarding the values of the other parame-
ters in the model, and these are set equal to the values given in table 1 of
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Table 1. Partial-Adjustment Coeﬃcients for Optimal
Inertial Taylor Rules
Model Optimal ρ for Diﬀerent Loss Functions
µr µπ µy ν∆i =.1 ν∆i =.5 νEi =.1 νEi =.5 νi =.1 νi =.5
.0 .0 .0 −.12 .19 −.04 .34 −.57 −.51
.3 .3 .3 .18 .37 .27 .48 −.27 −.12
.5 .5 .5 .64 .70 .63 .68 .70 .80
.8 .8 .8 .90 .94 .90 .92 .93 .96
.0 .0 .5 .03 .17 .05 .26 −.34 −.23
.0 .5 .0 −.12 .16 −.04 .31 −.54 −.44
.5 .0 .0 .49 .61 .49 .67 .28 .30
Notes: The optimal lag coeﬃcients for an inertial Taylor rule are
reported for each of seven parameterizations of the model, which have
varying µπ, µy, and µr weights on expectational terms, and for six varia-
tions of the loss function. The loss functions have equal weight on output
and inﬂation volatility (λ = 1) but a stronger or weaker interest rate
smoothing motive—which may take the form of minimizing ν∆iVar[∆it],
νEiVar[Et−1[it] − it], or νiVar[it − r∗ − π∗]. The associated optimal gπ
and gy are not reported.
equations (13), (14), and (15). For each loss function, the weight
on the interest rate smoothing (ν∆i, νEi,o rνi) is set equal to .5
or .1, while λ =1 . 26 Clearly in table 1, a large range of optimal
lag coeﬃcients—between –.6 and 1.0—can be rationalized for some
combination of model and loss function. Most interesting, however,
is how the expectational channel can magnify even a small cost of
interest rate ﬂuctuations in the central bank loss function to pro-
duce a sizable partial-adjustment coeﬃcient in the policy rule. Also,
note that the degree of optimal monetary policy inertia varies most
strongly with the value of µr, which determines the degree to which
interest rate expectations are forward looking. Such variation is con-
sistent with the interpretation of Woodford (1999, 2003) and Levin,
26The results in table 1 are obtained by numerically minimizing the loss func-
tion over the parameters gπ, gy, and ρ in the model. The results are obtained
using the “AIM” algorithm (Anderson and Moore 1985), available at www.
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Wieland, and Williams (1999) that policy inertia is optimal when it
alters expectations of future interest rates that are also important
determinants of current demand.
While an expectational channel for optimal monetary policy iner-
tia is valid in principle, it seems unlikely that such a channel is
responsible for empirical monetary policy inertia, because its under-
lying assumption of a fully credible policy rule seems so unlikely
historically. That is, even if economic agents were suﬃciently for-
ward looking (which is a separate, unresolved issue), the monetary
policy rule must also be assumed to be perfectly credible, so agents
know the rule and correctly assume that it will be followed.27 This
seems an unlikely description even for the relatively homogeneous
1987–2004 U.S. sample period underlying the above inertial pol-
icy rule estimates. In practice, the Federal Reserve may exhibit
some transparency, but it does not appear to have a commitment
technology.28
3.3 Uncertainty and Partial Adjustment
Uncertainty is the third general rationale often used to motivate
optimal monetary policy inertia. The intuition appears clear: uncer-
tainty breeds caution, and caution suggests a gradual adjustment of
the policy rate. As noted by Bernanke (2004), “Because policymak-
ers cannot be sure about the underlying structure of the economy or
the eﬀects that their actions will have on economic outcomes, and
because new information about the economic situation arrives con-
tinually, the case for policymakers to move slowly and cautiously
when changing rates seems intuitive.” However, the implication
that greater uncertainty produces greater inertia is not a general
theoretical result, and the empirical evidence for this proposition
appears weak as well.
27Still, this rationale may be a fruitful area for further research, particularly
in examining cases, as in Kara (2003), of partial credibility and an intermediate
amount of inertia.
28Informally, note that the Federal Reserve does not seem to have the requisite
control over forward interest rates (as evidenced most recently by central banks’
consternation regarding the “conundrum” of low long-term bond yields described
in Rudebusch, Swanson, and Wu 2006). A formal commitment counterfactual is
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Because economic data can be quite noisy, policymakers
inevitably operate with imperfect knowledge about the current state
of the economy. In addition, it may be the case that the noisier the
economic data are, the less aggressive policymakers should be in
responding to current readings on the economy (Rudebusch 2001;
Orphanides 2003).29 However, in empirical models, as noted by
Rudebusch (2001), any such inducement toward timidity (that is,
al o wgπ and gy) appears fairly modest and does not necessarily
translate into greater sluggishness (that is, a high ρ).
Uncertainty about the model provides another rationale for cau-
tion. Indeed, ever since the classic Brainard (1967) analysis, uncer-
tainty about the quantitative impact of policy and the dynamics of
the economy has been widely cited as a rationale for damped pol-
icy action. However, in the general case, as Chow (1975, chap. 10)
makes clear, almost nothing can be said even qualitatively about
how the optimal rule under model uncertainty changes relative to
the optimal rule under certainty. For example, the optimal policy
response parameters are not necessarily reduced in the presence of
uncertainty about several parameters. Thus, quantitative answers
are required. Rudebusch (2001) provides some simple but instructive
evidence that suggests that parameter uncertainty is not responsible
for policy inertia. The policymaker is assumed to face an economy
like (13), (14), and (15) on average (with µπ, µy, and µr set equal
to zero), but in any given quarter, the coeﬃcients may take on a
random value. These parameter shifts occur every quarter or every
few years. The policymaker has to choose the gπ, gy, and ρ parame-
ters of the inertial Taylor rule (1) and (2), so that the loss function
(10) is minimized. After allowing for uncertainty about all of the
coeﬃcients of the model, the optimal partial-adjustment coeﬃcient
actually falls a bit.30
29The general certainty-equivalence guideline is that optimal policy requires
the same response under both partial and full information about the state of the
economy. However, as discussed in Rudebusch (2001), the use of simple rules and
ineﬃcient output-gap estimates are two relevant exceptions for this analysis.
30This conclusion accords with much research on parameter uncertainty.
Notably, in Estrella and Mishkin (1999), Peersman and Smets (1999), Shuetrim
and Thompson (1999), and Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2001), there is no sig-
niﬁcant attenuation of the rule parameters. Some attenuation is found in Salmon
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Overall, although perhaps intuitive, the argument that uncer-
tainty could account for the very gradual persistence in the data
remains unproven.
4. Term-Structure Evidence on Inertial Policy Rules
To summarize the discussion so far, the single-equation estima-
tion of policy rules has yielded inconclusive results regarding the
existence of policy inertia, and the theoretical case for substan-
tial interest rate smoothing appears unconvincing as well. To make
some progress, this section turns to a vast and rich set of infor-
mation about central bank reaction functions: the yield curve of
interest rates. The yield curve contains such information because
if ﬁnancial market participants understand the policy rule that
links short-term interest rates to the realizations of macroeconomic
variables, then they will also use that rule in forming expecta-
tions of future short-term interest rates, which will be priced into
long-term bonds.31 In particular, any deviations from the policy
rule embedded in expected future short-term rates and expected
macroeconomic conditions would be arbitraged away. Therefore,
at any point in time, multiperiod interest rates, which embody
expectations of future short rates, contain much information about
the properties of the reaction function (also see Ang, Dong, and
Piazzesi 2005). In this section, I outline three diﬀerent meth-
ods by which this information can be extracted to inform the
debate on policy inertia. These methods diﬀer primarily by the
amount of economic structure imposed and by the frequency of data
employed.32
31Note that the assumption is not one of credibility and commitment as in
subsection 4.2 but one of transparency and learnability.
32For example, the three methodologies below use three diﬀerent treatments
of interest rate risk premiums. In the ﬁrst one, a time-varying term premium
is modeled in a simple ad hoc empirical fashion. In the second, a theoretical
no-arbitrage consistency is enforced between the underlying factor dynamics
and the term premium. In the ﬁnal one, the term premium is assumed con-
stant (i.e., the expectations hypothesis is assumed) over short thirty-minute
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4.1 Interest Rate Predictability at a Quarterly Frequency
Policy inertia has important implications for interest rate forecasta-
bility: in brief, the greater the delayed adjustment of the policy rate
in reaction to current information, the greater the amount of fore-
castable future variation. Intuitively, if the funds rate typically is
adjusted 20 percent toward its desired target in a given quarter, then
the remaining 80 percent of the adjustment should be expected to
occur in future quarters. Furthermore, assuming ﬁnancial markets
understand the inertial nature of monetary policy, they should antic-
ipate the future partial adjustment of the funds rate and incorporate
it into the pricing of longer-term maturities.
Rudebusch (2002b) shows that this general intuition is true in
a wide variety of macroeconomic models. The amount of such fore-
castable variation in interest rates can be measured via a standard
term-structure regression at a quarterly frequency such as
∆it = δ + γEt−2(∆it)+ψt. (19)
This equation regresses the realized change in the policy rate in
quarter t (i.e., ∆it = it−it−1) on the change that was expected two
quarters earlier at the end of period t − 2. Under rational expec-
tations, this interest rate forecasting regression would yield in the
limit an estimate of ˆ δ = 0 and ˆ γ = 1. However, for assessing the fore-
castable variation in the interest rate and hence the degree of mon-
etary policy inertia, the statistic of particular interest is the R2 of
this regression, which provides a natural measure of forecastability.
The theoretical relationship between the forecastable variation
in the interest rate, as measured by the R2 of the above predic-
tion equation, and quarterly policy inertia, as measured by the ρ
in the Taylor rule (1) and (2), is illustrated in ﬁgure 8. This ﬁgure
graphs the implied (population) value of the R2 of the regression (19)
as a function of ρ for a representative case of the model described
in section 3, namely, with µπ = .3, µr = .5, and µy =0 . 33 Note
33Also, gπ and gy are set equal to 1.5 and 0.8, respectively. As in table 1,
the unique stationary rational expectations solution for each speciﬁed policy
rule and model is solved via AIM (see Anderson and Moore 1985 and Levin,
Wieland, and Williams 1999). The reduced-form representation of the saddle-
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Figure 8. Implications for Interest Rate Forecastability
from Policy Inertia
that even for the non-inertial policy rules, there is some predictable
future movement in interest rates (with R2 = .10 when ρ = 0), since
there are predictable changes two quarters ahead in the output gap
and in the four-quarter inﬂation rate, which partly determine future
changes in interest rates. Even though the output gap and inﬂation
are highly persistent in levels, the associated slow mean reversion
implies only a modest predictability of future quarterly changes in
these series and the desired funds rate. However, as ρ increases, the
amount of predictable variation in ∆it+2 also increases, with an R2
value of .45 at ρ =0 .8.
Rudebusch (2002b) shows that this theoretical relationship
between partial adjustment and predictability is robust across a wide
variety of models (and for forecast-based policy rules as well). This
relationship can be empirically assessed by examining the extent of
model variables and the term spreads is obtained analytically, and the term-
structure regression asymptotic R
2 is calculated using the appropriate variances
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forecastable future movements in the policy interest rate in the data.
Speciﬁcally, if policy is highly inertial, as the single-equation reac-
tion functions suggest, then ﬁnancial markets should anticipate the
future partial adjustment of the funds rate. In that case, a regression
of actual changes in the funds rate on predicted changes embedded
in the yield curve should provide a good explanatory ﬁt and a fairly
high R2. In fact, researchers have found the opposite. They have
estimated a variety of interest rate forecasting regressions and, using
ﬁnancial market expectations, have found little predictive informa-
tion at quarterly frequencies with R2s very close to zero.34 For exam-
ple, Rudebusch (2002b) shows that eurodollar futures from 1988 to
2000 have very little ability to predict the quarterly change in the
funds rate two quarters ahead. The R2 of such a regression is .11,
which from ﬁgure 8 suggests that ρ is probably close to zero.35
This lack of predictive ability is well illustrated by the most
recent episode of monetary policy easing. Figure 9 gives the actual
target federal funds rate and various expected funds rate paths as
of the middle of each quarter based on federal funds futures. Under
quarterly policy inertia, the long sequence of target changes in the
same direction in 2001 would be viewed as a set of gradual partial
adjustments to a low desired rate. However, although the funds rate
gradually fell in 2001, market participants actually anticipated few of
these declines at a six- to nine-month horizon, as they would have if
policy inertia were in place. Instead, markets assumed at each point
in time that the Federal Reserve had adjusted the funds rate down to
just about where it wanted the funds rate to remain based on current
information available. Under this interpretation, the long sequence
of declines is the result of a series of fairly prompt responses to new
information that turned progressively more pessimistic. That is, the
34See, for example, Mankiw and Miron (1986) and Rudebusch (1995).
35Rudebusch (2002b) used a variety of structural models to show that the
large estimated lag coeﬃcients in the empirical inertial policy rules provided were
inconsistent with the very low interest rate forecastability in the term structure
of interest rates and that rules with highly serially correlated errors do not imply
such forecastability. S¨ oderlind, S¨ oderstr¨ om, and Vredin (2005) examine the for-
mer issue using a VAR model and survey data on macroeconomic forecasts and
ﬁnd evidence inconsistent with the standard inertial Taylor rule. In contrast,
in a highly forward-looking empirical model, Berkelmans (2006) argues that a
very inertial policy rule could be consistent with the interest rate predictability
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Figure 9. Actual and Expected Federal Funds Rate
presence of quarterly partial adjustment or policy inertia is contra-
dicted by the lack of forecastability of changes in the funds rate.
The latest episode of monetary policy tightening in the United
States may at ﬁrst glance seem to oﬀer more support for gradualism
and predictability in interest rates. During this episode, the FOMC
raised the target federal funds rate by 25 basis points at each of
the seventeen FOMC meetings that occurred during the two years
from June 2004 through June 2006. Of course, the mere fact that
the Federal Reserve engaged in a long series of interest rate increases
is not informative regarding quarterly monetary policy inertia. Such
persistent cyclical movements could reﬂect persistent changes in the
determinants of policy rather than the gradual adjustment of the
Federal Reserve to those determinants.36 However, as described in
36Occasionally, the argument is made that long sequences of interest rate
increases and decreases necessarily imply that changes in interest rates are pre-
dictable. This is the perennial argument of chartists and would suggest, for exam-
ple, that equity prices, the dollar exchange rate, and commodity prices are all
forecastable. Also, see the discussion in Goodhart (2005).118 International Journal of Central Banking December 2006
Figure 10. Actual and Expected Federal Funds Rate
Rudebusch and Williams (2006), this latest episode was unprece-
dented in that the FOMC provided direct verbal signals about future
policy rate changes. Starting in May 2004, the FOMC introduced
the following language into its public statement: “The Committee
believes that policy accommodation can be removed at a pace that
is likely to be measured.” This was a direct, though not unambigu-
ous, indication that the FOMC anticipated that the policy interest
rate could be gradually increased, and it was replaced in December
2005 by “some further policy ﬁrming is likely to be needed,” and in
January 2006 by “further policy ﬁrming may be needed.”
These verbal signals of future policy intentions would seem likely
to boost the predictability of interest rates, and, to a large extent,
this appears to have occurred but—importantly—largely at very
short horizons. This eﬀect can be discerned in ﬁgure 10, which gives
the actual target federal funds rate and various expected funds rate
paths as of the middle of each quarter based on federal funds futures
from 2003 to 2006. It is apparent that many of the expected interest
rate paths are remarkably well aligned with the actual path for the
ﬁrst three or four months into the future; however, after about fourVol. 2 No. 4 Monetary Policy Inertia: Fact or Fiction? 119
Figure 11. Actual and Expected Change in the
Funds Rate
months, ﬁnancial markets consistently underestimated the extent of
the future tightening. That is, markets expected an even more grad-
ual pace for the policy tightening than actually occurred. This is
not too surprising, since FOMC members made it clear that future
policy depended importantly on how the economic data unfolded in
real time, and during much of this episode the economic recovery was
not viewed as well established. For example, as the then–Vice Chair-
man of the Board of Governors noted (Ferguson 2004): “I believe it
to be very important that the FOMC not go on a forced march to
some point estimate of the equilibrium real federal funds rate. In my
judgment, we should remove the current degree of accommodation
at a pace that is importantly determined by incoming data and a
changed outlook.”
With respect to the forecasting regression (19), which is crucial
for judging the extent of quarterly policy inertia, ﬁgure 11 displays
the regression data, ∆it and Et−2(∆it), updated through 2006:Q2.
From this perspective, the past few years do not look that unusual.
Indeed, the residuals from the forecasting regression, ψt, are plotted120 International Journal of Central Banking December 2006
Figure 12. Residuals from Funds Rate Forecast Regression
in ﬁgure 12, and the last two years of the sample are not notable for
exhibiting extreme accuracy. Therefore, it appears that the recent
tightening episode was an example of short-run smoothing of policy
rates in the United States but is not inconsistent with the view that
policymakers engage in a limited amount of quarterly policy inertia.
4.2 Term-Structure Model Estimation at a Monthly Frequency
While the evidence in section 4.1 on the predictability of interest
rates is quite intuitive, it is somewhat indirect; that is, the absence
of policy inertia is inferred from the lack of interest rate predictabil-
ity evident in ﬁnancial markets. More-direct estimates of the degree
of interest rate smoothing would perhaps be more compelling, and
this section considers direct estimates of ρ. However, these estimates
of ρ diﬀer from the single-equation ones given in section 2 because
they are obtained in a complete system that combines key macro-
economic equations and information from the yield curve. The par-
ticular structure employed is from Rudebusch and Wu (2006). Their
analysis uses monthly data to formally estimate a model that com-
bines a fairly standard macroeconomic model with an oﬀ-the-shelf,Vol. 2 No. 4 Monetary Policy Inertia: Fact or Fiction? 121
no-arbitrage ﬁnance representation from the empirical bond-pricing
literature. Again, it is the incorporation of yield-curve information
that allows precise inference about the absence of monetary policy
inertia.
Almost all movements in the yield curve can be captured in a
no-arbitrage framework in which yields are linear functions of a few
unobservable or latent factors (e.g., Duﬃe and Kan 1996; Dai and
Singleton 2000). The Rudebusch-Wu macroﬁnance model employs
such a framework: speciﬁcally, it features a constant factor volatility
with state-dependent risk pricing of volatility, which implies condi-
tionally heteroskedastic risk premiums. The one-month short rate is
the sum of a constant and two unobserved term-structure factors,





t are termed level and slope factors. The dynamics
of these latent factors are given by
Lm
t = ρLLm
t−1 +( 1− ρL)πt + εL,t (21)
Sm
t = ρSSm
t−1 +( 1− ρS)





uS,t = ρuuS,t−1 + εS,t, (23)
where πt and yt are inﬂation and the output gap.37 These equations
can be given a Taylor-rule interpretation, with the factor Lm
t inter-
preted as the inﬂation rate targeted by the central bank, as perceived
by private agents. Private agents slowly modify their views about Lm
t
as actual inﬂation changes, so Lm
t is associated with an interim or
medium-term inﬂation target (as in Bomﬁm and Rudebusch 2000)
with associated underlying inﬂation expectations over the next two
to ﬁve years. The slope factor Sm
t captures the central bank’s dual
mandate to stabilize the real economy and keep inﬂation close to its
target level. In addition, the dynamics of Sm
t allow for both partial
adjustment and serially correlated shocks. If ρu = 0, the dynamics of
Sm
t arise from monetary policy partial adjustment, as in an inertial
Taylor rule. Conversely, if ρS = 0, the dynamics reﬂect the Fed-
eral Reserve’s reaction to autocorrelated information or events not
37In this substitution with monthly data, πt is the twelve-month inﬂation rate
and yt is capacity utilization.122 International Journal of Central Banking December 2006
captured by output and inﬂation, as in the Taylor rule with AR(1)
shocks.
Appended to the above equations is a small macroeconomic
model of inﬂation and output suitable for estimation with monthly
data, which also has some New Keynesian justiﬁcation:
πt = µπLm
t +( 1− µπ)[απ1πt−1 + απ2πt−2]+αyyt−1 + επ,t. (24)
yt = µyEtyt+1 +( 1− µy)[βy1yt−1 + βy2yt−2]
−βr(it−1 − Lm
t−1)+εy,t. (25)
That is, inﬂation in the current month is set as a weighted average of
the public’s expectation of the medium-term inﬂation target, identi-
ﬁed as Lm
t , and two lags of inﬂation. Also, there is a one-month lag
on the output gap to reﬂect adjustment costs and recognition lags.
Current output is determined by expected future output, Etyt+1,
lagged output, and the ex ante real interest rate, which is proxied
by it−1 − Lm
t−1 (that is, agents judge nominal rates against their
view of the underlying future inﬂation rate, not just next month’s
inﬂation). Finally, the speciﬁcation of longer-term yields follows the
standard no-arbitrage formulation. For pricing longer-term bonds,
the risk price associated with the structural shocks is assumed to be
a linear function of Lm
t and Sm
t .
The above macroﬁnance model was estimated by maximum like-
lihood (ML) for the sample period from January 1988 to Decem-
ber 2000. The complete parameter estimates and details are in
Rudebusch and Wu (2006); however, of particular interest for policy
inertia are the estimates of ρS, which is a minuscule .026, and of ρu,
which is .975. These estimates decisively dismiss the interest rate
smoothing or monetary policy inertia interpretation of the Taylor
rule. The persistent rule deviations occur not because the Federal
Reserve was slow to react to output and inﬂation, but because the
Federal Reserve responds to a variety of persistent determinants
beyond current output and inﬂation. Some intuition for this result
is given in ﬁgure 13, which displays the initial response of the entire
yield curve to inﬂation and output shocks from the estimated macro-
ﬁnance model. Positive shocks to inﬂation and output in this model
are followed by immediate increases in short-term interest rates,
and, for the inﬂation shock, these increases are more than one-for-
one. These responses—shown as the solid lines—reﬂect the absenceVol. 2 No. 4 Monetary Policy Inertia: Fact or Fiction? 123
Figure 13. Initial Yield-Curve Response to Output and
Inﬂation Shocks
Note: The solid lines show the impact responses on the entire yield
curve from a 1-percentage-point increase in inﬂation or output in the esti-
mated macroﬁnance model in Rudebusch and Wu (2006). The dashed lines
give similar responses in a macroﬁnance model that assumes substantial
monetary policy inertia (ρS =0 .9) and serially uncorrelated policy shocks
(ρu = 0).
of monetary policy partial adjustment or inertia. In contrast, the
dashed lines in ﬁgure 13 display the yield-curve responses from a
model that is identical to the estimated macroﬁnance model except
that ρS is set equal to .9 and ρu equals 0. This hypothetical alterna-
tive model has substantial monetary policy inertia, and it displays
markedly weaker responses to inﬂation and output shocks of yields
that have maturities of less than two years. The two quite diﬀerent
responses of the yield curve in these models illustrate the poten-
tial importance of the information contained in the term structure
for discriminating between the two models. Given the system ML
estimates, it is clear that the data prefer the macroﬁnance model
without policy inertia.124 International Journal of Central Banking December 2006
4.3 Intraday Interest Rate Reactions to Macroeconomic Data
As a third illustration of the power of the term structure to illumi-
nate the nature of the monetary policy reaction function, I provide
some new evidence on interest rate smoothing based on intraday
movements of the yield curve. The underlying insight exploited here
is similar to the one above: an inertial policy rule has important
implications for the evolution of the entire term structure through
time. Again, this approach is extremely powerful, because ﬁnan-
cial markets will enforce their understanding of the monetary policy
reaction function at each point in time and across interest rates
at all maturities. However, while the above results implement this
idea with models estimated at a monthly or quarterly frequency
and substantial economic structure, the results in this section are
based on the intraday response of the yield curve to macroeconomic
data releases and impose minimal structure. The resulting event
study provides further compelling evidence against the existence of
monetary policy inertia using very diﬀerent data and information.
Intuitively, changes in the path of expected future interest rates
following the release of news about the state of the economy should
reveal the degree of interest rate smoothing, because ﬁnancial mar-
kets will expect an inertial central bank to distribute the policy rate
changes over several periods. To illustrate this mechanism in a simple
formal structure, consider the policy inertia framework
it =( 1− ρ)β¯ πt + ρit−1, (26)
where it is the average short-term (daily) policy rate during quar-
ter t, which is set by the central bank to respond gradually over time
to the annual inﬂation rate, ¯ πt (the four-quarter percent change).
Also, annual inﬂation is assumed to be a simple AR(1) process,
¯ πt = δ¯ πt−1 + ε1,t + ε2,t, (27)
with two sources of independent random variation. These two shocks
are distinguished by the timing of their release dates during the
quarter. News about inﬂation in ε1,t is revealed at the very begin-
ning of quarter t, while the news in ε2,t is revealed sometime later
in quarter t. This analysis just explores the eﬀects of news in ε1,t,
while ε2,t is only included in the model to emphasize that knowl-
edge of ε1,t does not determine ¯ πt. Also, one of the key elements ofVol. 2 No. 4 Monetary Policy Inertia: Fact or Fiction? 125
the methodology in this section is that δ can be pinned down by
macroeconomic time-series data. In particular, for the inﬂation and
output series shown in ﬁgure 1, which are the relevant policy deter-
minants in the Taylor rule, the OLS estimates of δ, which have a
well-known downward bias, are .97 for inﬂation and .95 for output.
This evidence is consistent with the large literature examining the
persistence of various macroeconomic series that indicates that δ is
very close to 1.38
To calculate the immediate response of interest rates to the rev-
elation of ε1,t, note that at the end of period t − 1, the expected
value of the average interest rate over the next quarter is
E[it|e(t − 1)] = ρit−1 +( 1− ρ)βE[πt|e(t − 1)] (28)
= ρit−1 +( 1− ρ)βδπt−1, (29)
where E[·|e(t−1)] is the expectation conditional on the information
set at the end of quarter t−1. Similarly, just after the revelation of
ε1,t at the beginning of quarter t, the expected value of the quarter-t
interest rate is
E[it|b(t)] = ρit−1 +( 1− ρ)βE[πt|b(t)] (30)
= ρit−1 +( 1− ρ)β(δπt−1 + ε1,t), (31)
where E[·|b(t)] is the expectation conditional on the information set
at the beginning of quarter t. Therefore, the size of the revision to
the expectation of it in response to ε1,t news about inﬂation equals
∆E[it|∆] ≡ E[it|b(t)] − E[it|e(t − 1 ) ]=( 1− ρ)βε1,t. (32)
That is, the change in the expectation of it equals the amount
of inﬂation news multiplied by the policy response coeﬃcient and
reduced by a fraction for interest rate smoothing. Still, even with
data on the change in interest rate expectations, it is diﬃcult to
determine the size of ρ from this equation, on its own, because βε1,t
must be measured in some way.39
38For evidence on this point and references to the voluminous literature, see
Rudebusch (1992), Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), and Pivetta and Reis (2006).
39Macroeconomic data surprises relative to surveys of market participants may
help but are clouded by information in revisions to earlier data.126 International Journal of Central Banking December 2006
However, combining the revisions in expectations of it with revi-
sions of other expected future interest rates does allow the partial-
adjustment coeﬃcient to be determined. Speciﬁcally, note that at
the end of quarter t − 1, the expected value of it+1 is
E[it+1|e(t − 1)] = ρE[it|e(t − 1 ) ]+( 1− ρ)βE[πt+1|e(t − 1)] (33)
= ρ2it−1 +( δ + ρ)(1 − ρ)βδπt−1. (34)
At the beginning of quarter t, the expected value of it+1 is
E[it+1|b(t)] = ρE[it|b(t) ]+( 1− ρ)βE[πt+1|b(t)] (35)
= ρ2it−1 +( δ + ρ)(1 − ρ)β(δπt−1 + ε1,t), (36)
so the revision to expectations of it+1 in response to ε1,t is equal to
∆E[it+1|∆] ≡ E[it+1|b(t)] − E[it+1|e(t − 1 ) ]=( δ + ρ)(1 − ρ)βε1,t.
(37)
Finally, the ratio of the two revisions provides a straightforward
expression:
∆E[it+1|∆]/∆E[it|∆] = δ + ρ. (38)
If, as noted above, the value of δ is pinned down by the well-known
macroeconomic dynamics of inﬂation, then this ratio of revisions in
expected future rates will identify ρ.
To estimate the ratio above, I use intraday data on yields of three-
and six-month U.S. Treasury securities.40 The revisions in these two
yields are calculated over the half-hour period from ﬁve minutes
before a release of macroeconomic data to twenty-ﬁve minutes after
that release.41 Changes in the three-month yield during this window
40I also obtained similar results using interest rate expectations from daily fed-
eral funds futures and eurodollar futures. However, an advantage to using the
Treasury yields is that they enforce a consistent timing so that the macroeco-
nomic news always occurs at the beginning of the monetary policy adjustment.
In addition, Treasury markets are the most liquid ones.
41This thirty-minute window eliminates noise from extraneous sources, such as
other data releases or monetary policy actions or communications. The data are
discussed in G¨ urkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005a, 2005b) and were kindly sup-
plied by the authors. They obtained tick-by-tick, on-the-run Treasury yield data
back to 1991 from a consortium of interdealer brokers. They also show that a
thirty-minute window is suﬃciently wide to capture the full response of ﬁnancial
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provide a reading on ∆E[it|∆], while changes in a combination of the
two yields give ∆E[it+1|∆] via the expectations hypothesis—namely,
twice the six-month yield minus the three-month yield.42 For exam-
ple, if the three-month rate increases by 5 basis points in response
to a release of higher-than-expected consumer price inﬂation, and
the three-month rate expected three months ahead increases by 9
basis points, then their ratio provides an estimate of δ + ρ equal
to 1.8. Assuming inﬂation follows a unit-root process, so δ =1 ,
then the monetary policy partial-adjustment coeﬃcient is 0.8. That
is, in response to news about persistently higher inﬂation, ﬁnan-
cial markets assume that an inertial central bank will boost the
policy rate higher over the next few months but will also grad-
ually raise it even higher in subsequent months. Alternatively, at
the opposite end of the spectrum, if three- and six-month yields
change by an identical amount in response to a persistent shock
(so ∆E[it|∆ ]=∆ E[it+1|∆]), then δ + ρ = 1 and ﬁnancial mar-
kets assume that there is no monetary policy partial adjustment by
central banks.
In fact, the data indicate quite clearly that the case of little
or no inertia is the relevant one. I consider 315 macroeconomic
data releases from July 1991 to September 2004 for the unem-
ployment and CPI series, which are two of the most important
and closely watched data releases. Of course, the formal structure
outlined above applies to any persistent macroeconomic determi-
nant of monetary policy, so the unemployment and CPI releases
are pooled to increase the precision of the estimates. The median
value of ∆E[it+1|∆]/∆E[it|∆] is 1.00; the mean value is 1.06 with a
standard error of 0.15.43 Again, with the assumption that macroeco-
nomic time series are highly persistent, these results imply a central
tendency for ρ of around 0 to .1 and a 95 percent conﬁdence interval
that lies entirely below .4.44
42This calculation ignores the time-varying term premium modeled in
Rudebusch and Wu (2006) and discussed above; however, changes in the ratio of
these premiums at these very short maturities are likely insigniﬁcant.
43The median expectational revision ratios for inﬂation and unemployment
releases separately are also both equal to 1.0.
44These results also appear robust to consideration of longer maturities, as in
∆E[it+k|∆]/∆E[it|∆].128 International Journal of Central Banking December 2006
5. Conclusion
Does the persistence of the short-term policy interest rate reﬂect
deliberate “partial adjustment” or “inertia” on the part of the cen-
tral bank? As in many other areas of economics, understanding the
nature of dynamic adjustment is a hard problem that simple regres-
sion estimates often cannot solve. However, in contrast to many
other macrodynamic puzzles, interest rates have a rich set of term-
structure information that can help provide answers. One of the key
insights above is that although the short rate is a policy instrument,
it is also a fundamental driver of long yields, so a joint macroﬁ-
nance perspective can sharpen inference about the policy reaction
function. The yield-curve results above—for quarterly predictabil-
ity, monthly system estimation, and intraday responses to news—all
point to fairly rapid central bank reactions to news and information
and little real-world policy inertia. In essence, quarterly monetary
policy partial adjustment does not appear to be consistent with the
ﬁnancial market’s understanding of the monetary policy rule. This
absence of intrinsic inertia appears in accord with the views of many
central bankers, who often note that future policy actions will largely
be contingent on incoming data and future changes in the economic
outlook.
In terms of future research, much work can still be done to exploit
yield-curve information about the monetary policy reaction function,
especially in countries other than the United States. In addition,
further policy rule estimation and investigation is recommended.
The lagged policy rate in empirical monetary policy rules, although
perhaps useful in mopping up residual serial correlation, should
not be given a structural partial-adjustment interpretation with
regard to central bank behavior. A better strategy is to identify
and model the underlying persistent factors that inﬂuence cen-
tral bank actions. This task will not be easy. As Svensson (2003,
467) argues, the missing elements may be largely judgmental in
nature:
Whereas simple instrument rules, like variants of the Taylor
rule, may to some extent serve as very rough benchmarks for
good monetary policy, they are very incomplete rules, because
they don’t specify when the central bank should or should notVol. 2 No. 4 Monetary Policy Inertia: Fact or Fiction? 129
deviate from the simple instrument rule. Such deviations, by
discretion and judgement, have been and will be frequent....
In this case, policymakers should not be misled into viewing a
Taylor rule, or any simple representation of policy, as a completely
reliable guide to future actions.
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